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k Abstract
Numerous studies have shown that unmanned extraterrestrial sample
return missions are technically feasible, with Mars the planet of primary
interest. One consideration which has not received much attention in these
studies is the possibility of contamination of the terrestrial environment by
alien organisms returned with a vehicle containing an atmospheric or soil
sample. For the purpose of understanding some of the possible implications ,_
of a terrestrial quarantine constraint on a mission and for developing a basic
approach which can be used to demonstrate compliance beyond that developed
for Apollo, a terrestrial quarantine study has been performed at the Jet Pro- .
pulsion Laboratory. It is shown that some of the basic tools developed and
used by the planetary quarantine community have applicability to terrestrial
quarantine analysis. By using these tools, it is concluded that (I) the method
of biasing the Earth aiming point when returning from the planet is necessary
but, by itself, may not satisfy terrestrial quarantine constraints; and (2)
spacecraft and container design significantly influence contamination transfer.
!
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1. t) Introduction
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has estab-
lished requirements for the biological quarantine of planets involved in un-
manned exploration. All NASA unmanned planetary flight projects are
governed by a uniform set of planetary quarantine (PQ) requirements as set
forth in NHB 8020. 1Z, "Planetary Quarantine Provisions for UnmannedI
Planetary Missions," April 1969. These planetary quarantine requirements
do not apply to Earth itself.
This paper considers the quarantine aspects of returning samples to
Earth in unmanned planetary spacecraft. Some of these quarantine consider-
kx ations have been studied exte_asively in the United States in conjunction with
the manned lunar missions by the Interagency Committee on Back Contami- _--
nation [1] [2_]. Terrestrial quarantine (or back contamination) is defined as
contamination of the terrestrial biosphere with organisms or materials of
extraterrestrial origin. Unmanned planetary sample return missions have
quarantine aspects which differ considerably from both manned and "one-way"
unmanned mis sions.
": Z. 0 Mission and Spacecraft Description
Z. 1 Mission Description
The phases of an unmanned sample return mission are given in Fig-
ure I. To provide familiarity with sample return concepts, a return mission
from Mars was selected for this study. It is assumed that the outbound
flight and the landing are analogous to that of a Mars lander such as
'4
described in Reference 3. The recovery and quarantine phase is assumed
to be similar to the manned lunar missions as described in References 1 _, ,_
and I. For the return phase it Is assumed that an ascent vehicle containing _:;:(
Z
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the Nlars soil sample will rendezvous with a return vehicle in klars orbit
The return vehicle is then injected from Mars orbit on a transfer trajectory
to Earth.
The return flight of the mission can be appropriately described by con-
sidering the trajectory modes available as options and comparing the total
mission durations, injection energies from Mars, and Earth arrival veloci-
ties. On the return portion of the flight_ the interplanetary trajectory can be
of a conjunction or an opposition class (Figure 2). The conjunction class is
characterized by a minimum energy Mars=Earth trajectory (i.e., minimum
I fuel requirements). In order to achieve this, the spacecraft must stay on
Mars, or in Mars orbit_ for a duration of over a year to await the desired
\
planetary geometry. Converselys the opposition class is characterized by a
short stopover at Mars and shorter mission duration. However, the mission
is penalized with a larger fuel requirement ....
For this study the flighttime to Mars is assumed to be approximately
_ 200 days. The conjunction class return will result in a 509=day stay at Mars
and an injection energy from Mars orbit of 5.4 kmZ/s 2 with a resulting Earth _.
arrival velocity of 5.6 km/s. The total mission duration is approximately
I020 days. The opposition class return was determined for a 40=day stay at
Mars, which results in an injection energy from Mars orbit of 48 km2/s2 s
an Earth arrival velocity of 14.3 km/s_ and a total mission duration of 465
days. In summary, the conjunction class has _ mission durations but
smaller injection energy from Mars and smaller Earth arrival velocity than
_ the opposition class.
i 2, 2 Spacecraft DescriptionA study by Langley Research Center depicted a set of typical spacecraft!
that could be used for a Msrs sample return mission [4]. An example of a
3
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Mars descent lander from this study is shown in Figure 3. In this design an
indexable motor drive sample container is on the top part of the vohicl,, and
is mounted on the Earth reentry heat shield. _ The container receives its
samples from a rover vehicle by means of the sample transfer arm. At
liftoff, the ascent vehicle separates from the rest of the lander and x_ill later
rendezvous with the orbiting return vehicle. In Figure 4 the ascent vehicle
is shown mated with the return vehicle. The sample container and heat
shield are then attached to the return, and the remainder of the ascent
vehicle is subsequently detached and remains in Mars orbit. The return}
•.hicle then injects into a Mars-Earth transfer trajectory.
As the return vehicle approaches Earthp two options are considered:\
(1) the injection of a capsule into Earth orbit with the capsule late: being /
picked up by a space shuttle, or (2) the injection of a direct reentry capsule.
A typical design for each sample return option is shown in Figure 5.
3. 0 Analysis and Results
3. 1 Trajectory and Navigation Considerations
The conjunction class and opposition class return trajectory modes
were examined in detail in terms of navigation maneuver errors that would
result in probabilities of accidental Earth impact and then compared to pos-
sible levels of terrestrial quarantine constraints.
The out-of-Mars orbit injection maneuver was analyzed to determine
typical accidental Earth impact probabilities that would result from errors
J
in that maneuver. The magnitude of the injection maneuver was found to be
i_ approximately Z. 3 km/s for the conjunction class return and 7 km/s for the [i_t opposition return. Considering that an execution error in magnitude is
4
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usually about 0. 1 of 1% (based on the Mariner spacecraft seri,,s cxI_eriencc),
an error estimate in that maneuver of 1 rn/s was found to be reasonable.
The impact probability was calculated as a function of a distance from
the center of Earth (B) in the Earth aim plane; the results are shown in t.'i_-
ure 6. An interesting observation is that impact probabilities can be sub-
stantially reduced by biasing (increasing B) in the opposition class return,
whereas for conjunction returns the impact probability is relatively unchanged
by biasing. This was due to the fact that the error ellipse for the opposition
class is more elliptical than for the conjunction class.
I In summary, the results show that accidental Earth impact probabili-
ties due to likely execution errors in the out-of-Mars orbit injection maneuver
\ -z
will very likely be larger than 10 for reasonably desired aim points at
: Earth. If this value is modified by the probability of not being able to per-
?
_. form a corrective maneuver if on an impact trajectory, typically 1 0 then
_: such an error would satisfy a terrestrial quarantine constraint of 1 This0 "4.
assumes that the probability of Earth contamination given accidental impact
(PC/I) is unity, and a value significantly less tbeanunity would make the
quarantine constraint easier to meet.
3. Z Spacecraft Considerations
A typical Mars lander/ascent vehicle was shown in Figure 3. As the
vehicle resides the it is reasonable to that Martian
on surface, a 8 s_rle
material could transfer to the spacecraft surfaces by various natural or on-
board mechanisms. Dust particles could become detached from the surface
of the ascent vehicle and then be transferred to the orbiter surfaces during
rendezvous by means of dynamic events such as vibration, contact of docking
| surfaces, and docking mal_unctions.
=
s
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The possibility of contamination transfer to the orbitinu return vehicle
is best discussed with the aid of Figure 4. The direct reentry capsul_ con-
figuration (Figure 4 with details in Figure 5b) is used as an example for dis-
cussion of the contamination transfer mechanisms. When the ascent vehicle
docks with the return vehicle, it is actually docking with the orbiter portion
of the reentry capsule. When the ascent vehicle disengages and falls away
from the return vehicle, the heat shield and sample container remain at-
tached to the orbiter portion of the reentry capsule. The contamination on
the sample container would be trapped in the interior of the reentry capsule.
Special seals and bioshields would be necess_ ry to control possible problems
at the conjunction of the heat shield and the rear portion. To summarize,\
spacecraft leaving the Mars surface will be contaminated. The contamination ¢
transfer problems from the ascent vehicle to the return vehicle require de-
tailed study. Spacecraft design will make a considerable difference in mag-
nitude of these problems.
Design attention should be directed to the sample container and the on-
board monitoring necessary to assure integrity of the container. Specifically,
an adequate seal for the sample container is required not only to prevent
terrestrial contamination during the return flight and recovery, but also to
preserve the integrity of the sample. In addition, the possible disastrous
consequences of the release of sample contents into the Earthls atmosphere
due to meteorite impact or spacecraft breakup must be precluded. This
could be accomplished by enclosing the sample container in a sphere with an
outer ablative shield covering.
', To determine the condition of the spacecraft as well as the integrity of i,
! 'the sample container during the landing phase of the mission, a TV system i -i I.
-- could be used to scan the surface of the ascent vehicle to 11 ) determine "
"W6
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surface contamination from planet soil by comparing reflective properties of
an uncontaminated control surface against exposed surfaces, and (2) verify
the proper operation of the sample gathering and encapsulation mechanisms.
As the spacecraft returns to Earth, strain gauges or leak detection sensors
could monitor the condition of the sample container to detect leaks or break-
up. The complexity of these design considerations will be strongly dependent
on the stringency of the terrestrial quarantine constraints.
4.0 Conclusions
I
From the results of the trajectory and navigation analysis for a Mars-
Earth sample return trajectory, it is concluded that if a stringent terrestrial
\
quarantine requirement is imposed, the constraint could not be satisfied by
simply biasing the Earth aim point. Specifically, investigation of the out-of-
Mars orbit maneuver shows that a standard magnitude error in that maneuver
would result in an Earth impact probability of the order of 10 "Z. Assuming
a return rnidcourse maneuver "unreliability" of 10 "Z, the overall probability
of uncontrolled accidental impact would be 10-4. Even ifone assumes that .
accidental impact would result in the certainty of biologicalcontamination,
an overall terrestrialquarantine constraint on the order of 10=4 could still
be satisfied. However, a constraint of the order of 10-8 would generally
mean that terrestrialquarantine could not be satisfiedby navigation strategy
alone, i.e., biasing the Earth aim point. Other methods of controllingand
monitoring contamination transfer, such as spacecraft design, would bec'zme
increasingly important.
Finally., it is concluded that if planning of unmanned planetary return
%
missions is to proceed, a terrestrial quarantine policy should be established.
?
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